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PROHIBITION OF LAWFUL ASSEMBLY WHEN
OPPOSED BY THREAT OF VIOLENCE
Shortly after the war, a company of Jehovah's Witnesses
commenced a series of evangelistic meetings in the public
park of a small Iowa town. The first meeting was heckled
by a few local rowdies, but there was no violence. The second
meeting was broken up by twenty or thirty of the rowdies.
There was no police protection at either meeting. Jehovah's
Witnesses did not incite the attack by either word or act, but
were unpopular solely because of their pacifism during the
war. Town and county officials became alarmed by this dis-
turbance and by rumors that several hundred ex-servicemen
were planning to come from surrounding towns to attack the
third meeting. The proposed third meeting was prevented
by the sheriff, who, with the cooperation of the town officials,
set up a road blockade excluding the Jehovah's Witnesses and
everyone else from the town on the day the meeting was
scheduled. The evidence showed that the officials did not
act from hostility toward the Witnesses, but from a bona
fide desire to protect them from danger, and in the belief
that a riot was inevitable unless the meeting was prevented.
Jehovah's Witnesses sought an injunction against the
town and county officials in the federal district court under
the Federal Civil Rights Act,' alleging the prevention of the
meeting was a violation of their federally-protected rights of
free speech, assembly, and worship.2 They prayed a decree
1. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 8 U. S. C. § 43 (1940), implementedjurisdictionally by 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (14)(1940).
2. It is now settled that public parks and other public places, such as
streets, cannot be forbidden to those who wish to propagate their
views, religious [Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943)] or other-
wise [Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940)], individually
[Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939)] or through meetings[Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939)], so long as they do not
interfere with the rights of others [Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U. S. 569 (1941)].
However, an interesting question is raised by Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). The
MeCollum case involved an arrangement whereby the public
schools released school time and made available school facilities
to denominations which desired to furnish religious instruction for
pupils whose parents wished them to receive it. The arrangement
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restraining any interference with future meetings and order-
ing that such meetings be adequately protected. They also
asked declaratory, relief covering the same points. The court,
after trial, dismissed the petition on the merits, finding such
a clear and present danger of mob violence against the plain-
tiffs on the day their meeting was prevented as to justify the
abridgement of their right to freedom of speech, assembly,
and worship.2
The circuit court of appeals reversed, ordering that a
declaratory judgment be entered as prayed, and that juris-
diction be retained to enter an injunction should it become
necessary. 4 The court doubted whether the clear and present
danger test should have applied at all in the situation, but did
not reverse on this ground.5 It preferred to find that, even
was held unconstitutional as a state establishment of religion. It
can logically be argued that, if tax-supported schools cannot be
used by any denomination to propagate religious belief, neither
can tax-supported public parks. See Jackson, J., dissenting in Saia
v. New York, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (1948). What is the difference
between taxing the Illinois atheist to subsidize religious instruction
in the classroom and taxing the Iowa atheist to subsidize it in
the parks?
As was pointed out in Everson v. Board of Education, 830
U. S. 1, 17, 18 (1947), not all expenditures of public moneys which
happen to benefit religion amount to "establishment." Police and
fire protection can validly be extended to churches on the same basis
that they are provided for any citizen's property. The state may
not actively assist religion, but it need not, indeed may not, dis-
criminate against it. Neutrality is all that is required. When
the state permits religion to be taught in the schools it is giving
active assistance to religion. In the McCollum case, this fault
was compounded by the compulsory features of the plan there
used. Although pupils were not required to attend religious in-
structien unless their parents requested it, they had to attend
other activities instead, and were not released from school. More-
over, the school machinery was used to enforce attendance of
those who signed up for the religious classes. The benefit which
the state confers on a religious sect by allowing it to use the
public park does not amount to this sort of active assistance. It
is more like the benefit resulting from police and fire protection,
since it is extended to all without regard to any religious test.
Exactly the same rights, and no more, are extended to the religious
preacher in the park as are extended to any other citizen there.
And, of course, there are no compulsory features about the use
of a public park, comparable to those in the McCollum case.
Whatever be the merits of this distinction, it seems certain
that the McCollum case does not mean that the United States
Supreme Court will alter the status of public parks as a forum
for the expression of views on controversial questions, including
religion.
3. Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. Iowa 1946).
4. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (C. C. A. 8th 1947), cert. denied,
322 U. S. 851 (1948).
5. The relevancy of the clear and present danger test to the situa-
tion herein is discussed infra, p. 86.
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if the test applied, there was no clear and present danger of
mob violence, thereby overturning the district court's find-
ing of fact.
It is important to note at the outset that this case in-
volves speaking and assembling 6 for the peaceable transmis-
sion of ideas of a controversial nature. Concededly, then, it
is the kind of speech and assembly which finds protection in
the Constitution. Since that is true, this case is clearly dis-
tinguishable from those cases which involve abuse or misuse
of the right of free speech and assembly7
The most interesting problem posed by this case is wheth-
er otherwise lawful speech and assembly (or indeed lawful
activity of any kind) may be prohibited by public officials
because of danger that it may be opposed by the lawless. 8
The problem here arose in the setting of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in its role of guaran-
tor of freedom of speech and assembly against state encroach-
ment. The history of the problem, however, has been largely
a common law one.,
One must frequently sympathize with the officials, bent
upon preventing violence in the most practical way, and often
motivated by the sincere desire to protect the assemblers
from the dangerous consequences of their own folly. From
6. "Assembly," as used in the constitutional sense, is thought of as
a vehicle for expression-for speech. Therefore, it has been
thought proper to use the two terms more or less interchangeably.
Assembly and speech have been held to be "cognate rights." De-
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
7. For cases involving abuse of the right, see notes 24, 29 infra.
8. A separate question arising from this problem of prohibition is
the problem of protection. Should it be found, as in this case,
that conduct may not be prohibited, then undoubtedly officials
owe the duty of protection. This duty is, of course, not an abso-
lute one, but is judged by the standard of reasonableness under
the circumstances. Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927(1897); MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS §§ 661, 664 (1890).
The municipality, as distinguished from its officers, owes no duty
of protection at common laws but a frequent type of statute im-poses upon it absolute liability for damages to property caused
by riots. These statutes have been held not to include liability
for personal injury. COOLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98(1914). The problem of protection frequently arises in the form
of the nonstriker who attempts to go to work by passing a picket
line. It is not infrequent in such cases for the local officials to
adopt an expedient neutrality, even where the necessary force is
at hand to enforce the lawful rights of the nonstrikers.
9. See, in general, CH.AFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 160-161, 422-427 (1941 ed.); Chafee, Right of Assembly, 2 ENCYC.
Soc. SCI. 275 (1931); DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 256-261,
421-427 (3d ed. 1889).
[Vol. 24
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the officials' point of view, it is foolish to stand by and watch
a potential riot develop without taking steps to prevent it, the
most obvious step being, of course, to eliminate the cause
before the riot starts.
Yet public policy favors the rule that men need not give
up their lawful rights simply because the lawless insist on
attacking them. Traditionally, officials must enforce the law
the lawful way, not the easiest way. The consequences which
logically follow prohibiting freedom of rightful action or
expression to A because B threatens violence are so self-evi-
dent that they need not be labored.o These considerations
suggest the desirability of a rule that a peaceable exercise of
the right of free speech and assembly should not be prohibited
by public officials where it is or may be opposed by the law-
less. It cannot be pretended, however, that the cases on the
subject are harmonious. One must candidly admit that no
rationale, no matter how fine-spun, can reconcile them to one
another.
Thus one would think that there would be no problem
where there is a mere possibility that the exercise of the right
of free speech or assembly might excite hostility, and where
this contingency is based merely on a threat, or perhaps only
on an official's guess. Here, interference with the right in
order to prevent purely speculative harm seems completely
unjustified. Yet the cases are in sharp conflict. West v.
Commonwealth" sustained a conviction of breach of the peace
for taking part in a peaceful parade of the Ku Klux Klan.
10. If the reader thinks they should be labored, let him look to the
following: "If a permit can constitutionally be refused on the
grounds relied on by the defendants, a small number of lawless
men by passing the word around that they intend to start a riot
could prevent any kind of meeting, not only of radicals or Social-
ists or trade unionists, but also of Negroes, of Jews, of Catholics,of Protestants, of supporters of German refugees, of Republicans
in a Democratic community or vice versa. Indeed, on any such
theory, a gathering which expressed the sentiment of a majority
of law-abiding citizens would be forbidden merely because a small
gang of hoodlums threatened to break up the meeting. The only
proper remedy for such a situation, small or serious, is the police
protection to which citizens are entitled, whether they are singly
or in groups." Brief for the Special Committee on the Bill of
Rights of the American Bar Association, as Amicus Curiae, p. 19,
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939). Such a situation as that
envisioned in this quotation is not as fantastic as it sounds, when
we recall that the successful tactics of Fascists, Nazis, and Com-
munists have included the use of organized thuggery against all
who oppose them. It would be a sorry rule indeed which would
commit the forces of the law to the support of such tactics.
11. 208 Ky. 735, 271 S. W. 1079 (1925).
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The parade had been prohibited on the ground that the un-
popularity of the Klan might lead to violence against them. 2
(It was actually held without incident.) People v. Burman.
sustained a similar conviction of marchers, this time carry-
ing red flags in a Socialist parade. The unpopularity of the
red flag had created a hostile disturbance but apparently no
actual violence. The force of these cases, however, has been
a good deal weakened by Hague v. C.LO.,14 which held that
CI0 meetings in the public park of Jersey City could not
be prevented merely because numerous civic and veterans'
organizations had condemned the CI0 in resolutions, and
on one occasion had accompanied the condemnation with
threats, which were never tested by any actual attempt to
meet.1 5 This case is so squarely in conflict with the state
court decisions mentioned above that they are probably of
doubtful validity in the United States today. 6 Attempts
have even been made to halt the publication or distribution of
newspapers on the ground that the sentiments expressed in
them are so unpopular that they may excite the readers to
12. Contra: Shields v. State, 187 Wis. 448, 204 N. W. 486 (1925),
holding that the police could not interfere with a peaceful Ku
Klux Klan parade because of threats voiced against it. It should
be remembered, in discussing the Klan, or other unsavory organ-izations, that we are here concerned only with the propriety of
suppressing its meetings because they are unpopular. No at-
tempt is made herein to consider whether they may be suppressed
as being in themselves dangerous to the safety or good order of
the state. See, e.g., American League of Friends of the New
Germany v. Eastmead, 116 N. J. 487, 174 Atl. 156 (Oh. 1934)(Bund meetings, involving anti-Semitic speeches, could not be
suppressed on ground they angered Jews, but could be on ground
that their purpose was to foment boycotts and assaults against
Jews).
13. 154 Mich. 150, 117 N. W. 589 (1908).
14. 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
15. The Hague case involved an element not present in the other
cases discussed herein. It was found there that the city officials
had themselves been responsible for stirring up much of the op-
position to the CI0 and that Mayor Hague had sponsored and
spoken at some of the protest meetings; as the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals said, Mayor Hague "troubled the waters in order to fish
in them." 101 F.2d 774, 784 (1940). In the instant case, the
district court attempted to distinguish the Hague case on theground that the officials here acted in complete good faith. 69
F. Supp. 778, 786 (S. D. Iowa 1946). The distinction seems im-
material. Can the constitutional rights of A depend on the men-
tal state of B? Of course, if a criminal prosecution against B is
involved, or a question of punitive damages, B's mental state be-
comes important.
16. It would also appear to limit, if not to overrule, some contrary
language in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 331 (1920).
[VCol. 24
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violence against somebody (presumably the newsboys, or
perhaps the publisher himself).' Such attempts have uni-
formly failed.'
7
However, there may, concededly, be more than mere
threats or guesses. The danger may be real, not imaginary.
It may be apparent from a background of violence in the
recent past, when the attempted exercise of the right of free
speech or assembly was opposed, as in the instant case. Or,
the danger may appear from a hostile group which has formed
and is ready to do business right now. Suppose a woman
walks down a street in Ireland wearing an orange lily,.1 fol-
lowed by a threatening crowd of wearers of the green. May
a policeman, without making any attempt to disperse the
crowd, prevent disorder by plucking the lily from her dress?
The Irish court held that he might. 19 It is submitted that
the court was wrong. Suppose the hypothetical case of a
17. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, 89 N. J. Eq. 387, 105 Atl. 72
(Ch. 1918) (German language paper in World War I); Dearborn
Publishing Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ohio 1921);
People v. Downer, 6 N. Y. S.2d 566 (1938) (both anti-Semitic
papers). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 721, 722 (1931)
(anti-Semitic and muckraking paper).
18. The right to wear or carry an emblem which has an ulterior sig-
nificance [of. the red flags in People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150,
117 N. W. 589 (1908)] is closely connected with the right of free
speech. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 159-163
(1941 ed.).
19. Humphries v. Connor, 17 Ir. C. L. R. 1 (1864); accord, O'Kelley
v. Harvey, 15 Cox C. C. 435 (1883). But cf. The Queen v. The
Justices of Londonderry, L. R. 28 Ir. 440 (1891). A point worth
noting about O'Kelley v. Harvey, supra, is the unusual theory on
which it was decided. Most of the cases considered in this note
have involved deciding whether a peaceable assembly could become
unlawful if opposed [E.g., West v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 735,
271 S. W. 1079 (1925); People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 117
N. W. 589 (1908)1. If unlawful, there is no doubt of the privilege
of a policeman to use such force as is reasonably necessary to
break it up. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §141 (1934). But in O'Kelley
v. Harvey, which was an action against a public officer for
assault in dispersing a meeting of Irish land reformers, the court
conceded the meeting was lawful, but held that the officer was
nevertheless privileged to disperse it, where necessary to preserve
the peace. 15 Cox C. C. 435, 447 (1883). The case is, so far as
we can find, unique in tort law. It is, of course, well recognized
that public officers or private individuals are privileged to invade
interests in property where necessary to protect greater interests
during public emergencies. A common illustration is the razing
of a building in the path of a fire. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 196
(1934); HARPER, TORTS § 58 (1933). The writers on torts do
not seem to recognize any analogous privilege to invade interests
in personality during the public emergencies. O'Kelley v. Harvey,
however, recognized such a privilege. While, as indicated, the
O'Kelley case probably was wrongly decided, yet if one adopts, as
19481
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policeman coming upon a 250-pound footpad robbing a 125-
pound citizen of his wallet. May the policeman, to avoid the
very real danger of a serious breach of the peace, command
the citizen to deliver his wallet peacefully to the footpad,
using force, if necessary, to procure obedience? It is difficult
to distinguish this situation from the orange lily situation.
The right of free expression may well be as dear to its pos-
sessor as the contents of his wallet. Even where the danger is
real, the police should not be allowed to prohibit the exercise
of lawful rights.
Such was the opinion of the English court which decided
the famous case of Beatty v. Gillbanks.20 There, there was
no question as to the reality of the danger. A series of Sal-
vation Army parades had been attacked by hoodlums. The
final such incident had culminated in a full-scale riot, involv-
ing 1,000 persons, during which the police were temporarily
overpowered and order was restored only with the aid of
reinforcements. An order was obtained from two justices
of the peace, forbidding further assemblages to the disturbance
of the peace. Three days later the Army attempted to parade
again, disregarding the order. A similar mob, several hun-
dred strong, again assembled to dispute its passage. After
the Army ignored a command to disperse, the police took its
leaders into custbdy. They were adjudged guilty of unlawful
assembly, but the convictions were reversed by the Queen's
Bench Division, Justice Field saying, "What has happened
here is that an unlawful organization has assumed to itself
the right to prevent the appellants and others from lawfully
assembling together, and the finding of the justices amounts
to this, that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act
if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an
unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition. ' '21
some courts have, the idea that peaceable assembly may be dis-
persed, it would seem more logical to follow this theory of an
emergency privilege than to try to torture lawful conduct into
the mold of crime.
20. 9 Q. B. D. 308 (1882).
21. 9 Q. B. D. 308, 314 (1882). But cf. Star Opera Co. v. Hylan,
178 N. Y. S. 179, 108 N. E. 838 (1919) (production of opera in
German prohibited immediately after World War I, where it
led to serious riots in New York City). The most likely ground
on which the Opera case can be distinguished from the Beatty
(Salvation Army) case is that the Beatty case involved a more
fundamental right (the right to propagate religious ideas) than
did the Opera case. In other words, that even in areas where the
state may not interfere with the right to disseminate ideas, it
[Vol. 24
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The Beatty case has led us to the threshold of the most
difficult situation of all. Suppose that there is a real danger
of violence so savage that the police obviously will not be able
to cope with it. Should they not be able to postpone the as-
sembly temporarily until they can furnish adequate protec-
tion?22 Should the right to assemble include, under such cir-
may interfere with other, presumably less vital, rights-in this
case the rights to produce and listen to opera. Such a distinction
would overlook the fact that a composer-dramatist like Wagner
may well exercise, under the guise of entertainment, a more pro-
found influence on the thinking of his time than a whole raft of
preachers and soapbox orators. See G. BERNARD SHAW, THE
PERFECT WAGNERITE (1898).
But there is a more fundamental objection to any distinction
here between the right to propagandize and the right to pursue
any other lawful course of conduct. In many situations it is at
least arguable that the right to propagandize is so essential to
the free trade in ideas, upon which a healthy, dynamic society
depends, that compared to other rights it ought to occupy a pre-
ferred position as against state regulation. See United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
However, it is the writer's opinion that no such preference
should exist here. The right to engage in lawful conduct and to
be protected therein against the lawless is the fundamental rea-
son for the existence of organized government. The protection
of the right, therefore, is equally vital to government regardless
of the benefits which its exercise may or may not confer, for if
the right is not protected, government has failed in its basic
function. While this note concerns itself only with the specific
rights covered by the First Amendment, it is earnestly felt that
rights not coming within this category should be afforded no
less degree of protection than those that do. In other words, the
right to preach a sermon, to produce an opera, to continue opera-
ting a strikebound factory, or to wear a long beard in a town
where long beards are unpopular [See CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 151-152 (1941 ed.)] seem equally
fundamental when it comes to vindicating them against the law-
less. The basic question here is not the social utility of the par-
ticular right at stake, but the manner in which society is to
meet a challenge which goes to the very purpose for which it
exists.
22. The British Parliament apparently thought so. The Public Order
Act, 1936, 1 Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 6, provided (§ 3) that to
prevent "serious public disorder" the police could prescribe the
route to be taken by processions, and could restrict the display
of flags, banners, and emblems. In cases where such measures
were not deemed sufficient, they might, with the approval of the
borough or district council and the Secretary of State, entirely pro-
hibit for three months all processions or any class of procession,
to prevent such disorder. [During the war, the act was tempor-
arily replaced by an order in council, which broadened the pro-
visions by including not only processions but all meetings, and by
removing the three month limit. Defense (General) Regulations,
1939, § 39 E (S. R. & 0., 1939, No. 927, as amended by S. R. & 0.,
1939, No. 1681). Revoked by S. D. & 0., 1945, No. 504.]
The act does not differentiate between processions disorderly
in themselves and those which by their unpopularity occasion
disorder in others. The debates on the bill, however, show that
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cumstances, the right to commit virtual suicide? At the risk
of seeming dogmatic, the answer is yes, it should. True, not
many people will be likely to avail themselves of this right.
Nor will the situation often arise. But where it does, the
right of a man to follow his own lawful desires should be
absolute, no matter what the consequences to him personally
may be. The arguments which have been advanced above to
support the proposition of an absolute right of peaceable
speech and assembly are just as valid in emergencies as they
are at any other time.
23
It should be apparent from the foregoing that where
speech or assembly is merely unpopular, the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test 24 is thought to be irrelevant. It has always
been applied to what, for lack of a better label, we may de-
nominate "wrongful" speech, that is, speech which is directed
toward the accomplishment of some substantive harm.2 5 Un-
it was devised to meet the tactics of the British Fascists, who
marched into Jewish and working-class districts with the deliber-
ate intent of provoking fights with Jews and Communists. March-
ing in uniformed military formations, shouting slogans like "Down
with the Yids," they used every trick they knew to provoke attacks
by inspiring hatred and terror in the inhabitants. They succeeded
in starting serious riots in the East End of London. See the
remarks of Mr. Bernays (Parliamentary Debates, 317 House of
Commons, col. 1392) and of Mr. Morrison (13 id., col. 174, 175).
In view of this legislative history, and of the fact that the
rest of the act is aimed at various other kinds of typically Fascist
political hooliganism, it could well be argued that § 3 of the act
was meant to apply only to deliberately provocative processions,
and not to peaceful but unpopular groups. For a discussion of
provocative, as opposed to merely unpopular, conduct, see p. 87
infra.
23. Of course, there comes a time when hostile violence may become
so explosive as to threaten not the assemblers alone, but the very
structure of society itself. But this is a situation for martial law.
Until martial law is validly declared, the ordinary constitutional
guarantees should remain in full force. The subject of martial
law is too large to be considered within the scope of this note.
Yet, it should be noted that even where martial law has been
validly proclaimed, it does not (at least in peacetime) confer un-
limited discretion on the executive to prohibit lawful activity,
where the power is at hand to protect it from lawlessness. Strut-
wear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936)
(statutory three-judge court).
24. "The question in every case [in determining whether speech can
be made unlawful] is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create d clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that... [the state] has the right to prevent." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) (publication of
leaflets designed to obstruct enlistment and cause insubordination
in the armed forces in wartime); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S.
[VCol. 24
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der the test, even such "wrongful" speech is not unlawful if
it does not threaten to bring about the harm immediately.
But where there is a "clear and present danger" that it will
bring the harm about, it may be prohibited. The thesis of
this note, however, has been that "rightful" speech or assem-
bly, that is, speech or assembly which is objectionable only
because the lawless intend to prevent it, can never be pro-
hibited so long as the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution are in effect.
A qualification of this proposition occurs, however, where
the hostility to the assemblers is caused by their use of offen-
sive or provoking language. If this is the case, the language
may be punished. But, in view of the present state of the
law in the United States, probably neither the meeting nor
the offensive language could be prevented. 26 Of course, the
delicate question here is where unpopular but legitimate
speech ends and incitement to breach of the peace begins.
Difficult though it be to draw the line, in general the dis-
tinction is made between the bona fide effort to change men's
minds (even where that involves vigorous and tactless ex-
pression of views on controversial subjects) and the use of
vulgar or abusive language in a deliberate attempt to stir up
trouble. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,27 for example, a convic-
tion for incitement to breach of the peace was reversed where
a Jehovah's Witness had played a phonograph record attack-
ing the Roman Catholic Church in the presence of a pair of
Catholic pedestrians. That was a sincere, if tactless, effort
to change men's thinking. But Wise v. Dunning28 upheld the
decision of a lower court binding a Protestant minister over
to keep the peace29 where his attacks on the Roman Catholic
242 (1937) (soliciting memberships in the Communist Party,
which advocates "ultimate resort to violence at some indefinite
time in the future against organized government").
26. The general rule is that not even defamatory or obscene speech
can be subjected to previous restrait (4 BL. CoMimi. 151, 152),
e.g., by an equity decree [Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,(1931)]. If it cannot be prevented by a court of equity, a fortiori
it probably could not be physically prevented by police officers.
27. 310 U. S. 396 (1940).
28. [1902] 1 K. B. 167.
29. See also Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Yeates 93 (Pa. 1800), holding
that a libeler could be bound over to keep the peace. Do not
such cases apply a previous restraint? Apparently not in such
a form as to conflict with the policy of Anglo-American law.
Blackstone enumerates the offenses of libel and provoking a
breach of the peace among those by which a bond might be for-
19481
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Church were accompanied by gratuitous insults, such as mak-
ing sport of a rosary and crucifix. And the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a conviction for disorderly conduct where de-
fendant, addressing an anti-Semitic meeting, stated that he
supposed some of the "slimy scum outside" (referring to a
mob picketing the hall) had gotten in.ao
The instant case, judged by all the criteria herein, was
correctly decided. There was the threat of future violence,
given substance by a history of past violence. But the as-
semblers were lawful and peaceable in their conduct, and did
not provoke the violence by abusive language. A dozen trained
officers and a hundred special deputies were used to prevent
the meeting; they could have been used to protect it. But
even had it been impossible to protect the meeting at all, the
officials should not have been allowed to prevent it. The
very purpose of maintaining peace and order is to permit the
feited. 4 BL. COMM. 150. Yet on the very next page he enunciates
the now famous rule against "previous restraint." 4 EL. COMM.
151, 152. Logically, it would seem that there is no more re-
straint in an injunction than in a recognizance to keep the peace.
For that matter, it has been pointed out by more than one writer
that an equity decree, violation of which would lead to punishment
for contempt, is no more a previous restraint than a criminal libel
statute, violation of which would lead to punishment after a jury
trial. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, 29 HARv.
L. REV. 640, 651 (1916); WALSH, EQUITY 264 (1930). Probably
the real distinction 'is that an action on a recognizance and an
indictment for violating a statute both furnish the safeguard of
a jury trial, whereas punishment for violating an equity decree
stems from a single person, the chancellor. And note that "Con-
trol of the matter by a judge in a court of law is equally odious-
witness Fox's Libel Act [32 Geo. 3, C. 60 (1792)]." Moscovitz,
Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REv. 144,
148 (1944).
30. City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 79 N. E.2d 39 (Ill. 1948); accord,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). In the Ter-
rniniello case, the affirmance of the conviction seems to rest upon
rather insecure ground. The picketing mob assaulted persons
coming to the meeting, threw rocks through windows, and were
only restrained from completely breaking up the meeting by
seventy of Chicago's finest. Query whether a person thus sav-
agely attacked should be convicted of crime for venting his anger
through name-calling. Nothing the defendant said could possibly
have added to the tumult, since the mob which he reviled could
not even hear him. The affirmahce rested on two other grounds:
(1) That the anti-Semitic speech of defendant, including
vicious slanders against the Jewish race, tended to incite his own
followers against the Jews. Here, it seems, the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test should apply. (See note 24 supra.) The court did
not discuss the test, nor do the facts seem to fulfill its require-
ments.(2) That the holding of the meeting at all in the face of
such strong opposition was punishable. This theory has already
been extensively discussed herein, and will not be labored further.
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unimpaired pursuit of lawful conduct. To prevent lawful
conduct under the guise of preserving peace and order is
altogether anomalous. It is to be hoped that the rule of this
case will be followed and extended.
CRIMINAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL STATUTES CON-
TAINING NO REQUIREMENT OF MENS REA
A state embezzlement statute which dispenses with mens
real as a constituent of the crime is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, according to a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of New Mexico. State v. Prince, 189 P.2d 993 (N. M.
1948).
Defendant was charged in an information based upon a
New Mexico statute which reads: "Any person being in the
possession of the property of another, who shall convert such
property to his own use, or dispose of such property in any
way not authorized by the owner thereof, or by law, shall be
guilty of embezzlement .... -2 This statute expressly repealed
a prior embezzlement statute which had included nens rea as
a requisite of the crime.3
The trial court sustained a motion to quash the informa-
tion as unconstitutional and void, notwithstanding the fact
that the information did allege mens rea.4 Upon review by
writ of error, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court that the statute upon which the information
was based was invalid. It was held that the statute consti-
tuted a denial of due process in that to make an "innocent"
act a crime is "inconsistent with law," and that the statute
1. As used throughout this note, the term mens rea is defined as
meaning the intentional or reckless doing of an act forbidden by
the criminal law, with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for,
the facts which make the act forbidden. Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91, 96 '(1945); Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246,
257 (1907); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 138-168,
esp. 148-49 (1947).
2. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4519 (1941).
3. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 1543 (1915).
4. Courts frequently read the requirement of nens rea into statutes
which have omitted it. Cases cited notes 34, 35, and 36 infra.
When a statute is so construed, it is uniformly held that if the
indictment or information alleges mens rea, the charge is suffi-
cient. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S. 224 (1921).
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